


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RESERVE COMPONENT LEADER DEVELOPMENT
-- A SHORTFALL --

BY

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RESERVE COMPONENT LEADER DEVELOPMENT: A SHORTFALL
AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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ABSTRACT

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The successes of the US Army in the 1990s can, be attributed to the vision provided by the Six Army Imperatives: quality force, forward-looking warfighting doctrine, appropriate force mix, tough realistic training, continuous modernization and confident, competent leaders. These imperatives have been rigorously implemented in the Active Component force. Most have been implemented in the Reserve Component. We have not pursued the development of confident, competent leaders in the Reserve Components with the same vigor as we have the other imperatives. This shortfall became evident in the performances of the three National Guard Roundout Brigades mobilized for DESERT STORM. This paper will examine ways to ensure proper levels of readiness of Reserve Component combat maneuver brigades by improving the preparation of future RC combat brigade and battalion Commanders.



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INTRODUCTION

The direct military threat to the United States has diminished significantly since the breakup of the Soviet Union. This coupled with strong economic pressures are forcing a reduction in the Defense Budget. The reduction of Active Component (AC) units will continue to place emphasis on the readiness of Reserve Component (RC) forces.

This paper will examine ways to enhance readiness of Reserve Component combat maneuver brigades and reduce their post mobilization training time. In October 1989 General Vuono outlined six imperatives critical to the development of a strong Total Army: (quality force, forward looking warfighting doctrine, appropriate force mix, tough realistic training, continuous modernization and confident, competent leaders)¹. These imperatives have provided us with a vision that we have applied very effectively to the active force. We have not done as well in the RC. Two of these imperatives are much harder to implement in the RC because they demand more time than has been available: Providing tough realistic training and producing competent, confident leaders are closely related goals. It takes time to carry out and maintain such imperatives. We understand the significance of key leader development, but we need to reemphasize its role in the RC.

We all must recognize that as uniformed service members we have taken an oath to protect and defend the Constitution of the United States... We are always measured against the same standard--the protection of a way of life. As a group, we

must ensure that every officer, NCO, soldier understands that Leader Development is a holistic process and it is our reason for being.

Gordon R. Sullivan
Major General, U.S. Army
D/Commandant, USACGSC
24 August 1987 2

WHERE DO WE STAND WITH THE TOTAL ARMY?

Operation DESERT STORM validated the quality of the Total Army. Though it can be argued that the enemy was far from "world class", the US Army's joint doctrine, training, equipment and most of all its superb soldiers combined to gain a solid victory that stirred the Nation and reaffirmed our superpower status to the World. Our training programs are on the mark. The Combat Training Centers (CTC), our top-of-the-line equipment, and superb individual training strategies, all designed to produce and support quality soldiers, have produced the best peacetime fighting force we have ever fielded. All types of units-combat and support, active and reserve-excelled during the Gulf War. Difficulties came up, as in any military operation, but they were mastered. Yet one controversy that arose during the war centered on the mobilization and deployment preparation of the Army National Guard Roundout Brigades. Many RC combat support and combat service support units were mobilized and rapidly deployed to the theater. The "single functional" RC units (transportation; petroleum, oil, and lubrication [POL] dispensing; military police; and field artillery) all reportedly performed well.

However, the first combat maneuver units (the roundout

brigades) were not certified for deployment until the day after the cease fire. Senior commanders clearly anticipated that these units would require some additional time to become combat ready. It has always been assumed that roundout brigades would need some post-mobilization training prior to deployment. This paper will not revisit at length the issue of post mobilization training required in the fall of 1990/early 1991 for the three USARNG roundout brigades. Enough has been written-some emotional, some not; some questionable. This paper will address the status of leader competence in these units and develop a strategy to shorten post-mobilization training time for all RC maneuver units by improving the competence of their leaders prior to mobilization. These future leaders should be available and fully capable of leading their units during mobilization, rather than being trained away from their units. Robert Goldich, in his Congressional Research Service report pointed out that many officers and NCOs were sent to formal schools shortly after their units were mobilized. The imperative of confident, competent leaders had not been met. This training shortfall had to be corrected precisely when the units needed their leadership the most-during the initial upheaval of the mobilization.³

I bring some prejudices to this discussion. I have participated in the evaluation of RC (armor and armored cavalry) battalions and squadrons on various occasions and in various capacities in Texas, New York, Tennessee and most recently with the 48th Separate Infantry Brigade (M) of the Georgia Army

National Guard.

In my opinion, combat units, brigade and below, in the RC have improved markedly since the late 1970s. During this same period AC units have improved to an even greater extent. The readiness differential between AC and RC units has therefore increased. Some reserve units are at a higher level of readiness than many AC units were prior to 1980. I am not alone in this view. LTG (Ret) Frederick J. Brown agrees:

There has been an order of magnitude improvement in the Reserve readiness in the past two decades. More competent, better motivated personnel, provided specific mission focus and the necessary equipment, have responded to create certainly the most ready Reserve force our nation has possessed since World War II...Today, some Reserve forces equal, if not exceed, the professional competence, of the Active force in the 1970's. They are more capable than the active forces of many other Nations. 4

This improvement is in no small measure a result of an increase in Federal Appropriations for RC units from \$1.3 Billion to \$4.4 Billion between 1975 and 1985. 5

ROUNDOUT in the STORM

Why then did some RC units, specifically the Roundout Brigades, require so much post-mobilization training time? How did the other reserve units that deployed to the desert meet acceptable performance standards within a relatively short time frame?

The RC deployers were all single functional units. Many were combat service support companies, some were battalion sized combat support units and a few were field artillery brigades. Their unit mission is simpler to conduct than that of the maneuver combat arms. The problem was preparing battalion and brigade sized combat maneuver units for deployment and potentially quick commitment to combat. The skills required at the field grade level to train, maneuver and synchronize the combat maneuver elements with the combat support and combat service support elements are so complex that they take years to master. We are asking too much of our reserve component combat arms officers given the time we dedicate to prepare them to command combat maneuver units. The tasks required at the field grade level in combat maneuver units have become increasingly complex over time. Our AirLand Battle doctrine requires a significant amount of technical and tactical expertise. General Burba nicely summarized the situation before the House Armed Services Committee 8 March 1991:

Why couldn't we have had the roundout units at sufficient readiness posture to have deployed quickly with their parent divisions? Why is it so challenging to keep our reserve combat units at high readiness posture when we

have reasonable good success with our support units?

The answer is these latter combat support and combat service support units generally have noncomplicated unit functions, even though many of their individual skills are complex. They include units with civilian equivalences, such as medical, maintenance, transportation and supply as well as equipment-oriented unitary task specialties that can be accommodated during weekend training such as aviation, artillery, air defense, and engineers.

On the other hand, combat units, such as (armored) cavalry, infantry, and armor have maneuver skills and complex synchronization skills at company level and higher that are difficult to train during weekend drill periods. The training of these combat units at company level and higher integrates not only maneuver skills, but those of Army aviation and Air Force lift and fire support, artillery, air defense artillery, engineer, signal, military intelligence, maintenance, supply, transportation, medical, military police, chemical, and a whole host of others.

They have to synchronize everything that we do on the battlefield. The tasks and standards associated with these synchronized skills change at all levels as battlefield conditions change. Their execution is more an art than a science, and they take considerable time and effort to master. 6

The Roundout concept in general and the Roundout Brigades in particular have received much criticism as a result of Desert Shield. General Burba has clearly summarized the reasons why the Roundout Brigades were not prepared for deployment as quickly as the other Reserve and National Guard units that did deploy soon after mobilization.

The quick deployment of many RC combat support and service support units validates the Total Army concept. The skills required at the field grade level in the combat maneuver arms require more time and somewhat more costly training to develop and maintain. The RC combat arms officers are not trained to the same standard as their AC counterparts. This has occurred

because we have slighted the imperative of developing confident, competent leaders in the reserves-the very imperative which has enhanced active component professionalism and effectiveness. Total parity in AC/RC leader competence is an unrealistic goal. We must, however, raise the competence level of the majority of RC officers to a level that enables them to lead their units through the initial stages of mobilization and to plan and conduct effective post mobilization training.

The professional development of all officers and NCOs occurs in three areas: in the officer/NCO education system (institutional training), through experience gained in operational assignments, and through self development. The typical RC officer gets less training and development than does his AC peer. In most cases he has a full time job not related to his military responsibilities. He has family responsibilities in addition to his commitment as a commissioned officer. Many times the best he can do to meet the military education system requirements and balance his other commitments is to take the required courses by correspondence. I once evaluated an RC battalion key staff officer that had never attended a resident course after the Armor Officer Basic Course. He was a dedicated, serious officer. But he had serious deficiencies in his military education. If you have never seen a battalion tactical operations center function properly, it is extremely difficult to take valid corrective action. He was at a serious disadvantage in not knowing what to do to correct serious command and control

deficiencies in his tactical operations center (his TOC had the "blackhole" syndrome, information flowed in and disappeared). Such a situation jeopardizes the soldiers; their lives could depend on the ability of the battalion TOC to facilitate command and control of the unit.

The level of officer dedication is basically equal in both components, in my opinion. Many RC officers dedicate an extensive amount of extra hours to their "part time" profession. Quality and dedication are not the issue. Leader selection and leader development are the central issues.

The heritage of RC units is rich. Many unit lineages predate the Regular Army. In many units the same surnames have served in units for centuries. These units' versatility is increased by the civilian skills the soldiers bring as individuals to the unit. Their resourcefulness is enhanced by the cohesion borne of lower personnel turbulence.

The single most significant deficiency, which prevents RC units from reaching active duty levels of readiness, is time. Time to conduct unit and individual training. Time to train unit leaders. The extensive administrative burden that plague AC units wears more heavily on RC units. RC leaders are pressured by recruiting and retention, they must concurrently supervise on going training, plan future training and retain their currency with doctrine. Most units are spread over large geographical areas which further aggravates the problem. The insertion of capable AC officers into RC units as members of the unit, not as

advisors, would do much to alleviate these pressures. AC officers with years of experience in AC tactical units, in addition to the institutional training experiences of the current full time support officers in the AGR program, would bring a new dimension of practical unit experience with them.

Goldich outlines the pro's and con's of this concept. The downside of this concept focuses on the following:

- (1) AC officers might have difficulty integrating into RC organizations.
- (2) Holding RC units to a higher standard in peacetime will hurt recruiting and retention.
- (3) Create conditions under which Guard members would merely try to "stonewall" suggested improvements by the AC officers and wait them out.

These perceived disadvantages do not outweigh the advantages. Imposition of higher standards and the introduction of new doctrinal concepts is central to improving RC units and the reduction of post mobilization training time. Guard members may well try to wait out the unpopular suggestions/programs of the AC officers during their 2-4 year tours. This phenomenon is a fact of life in many settings and is dealt with daily. Lastly, if higher standards lead to lower retention rates in RC units then we have deeper problems in our RC units than shortfalls in leader development. Good soldiers stay in good units regardless of component.

Too often we find that headquarters elements have become so

over-burdened with the administrative requirements of coordinating the home station trainup and the deployment that they arrive at the CTC poorly prepared to exercise command and control. I observed this problem during two rotations as a brigade XO, another as a battalion task force commander, and two others as a home station observer/controller.

The modern battlefield is more complex and fast-moving than it was a mere twenty years ago. Our doctrine demands a higher level of leader competence as General Burba specifically noted. RC units should not conduct CTC rotations until platoons and companies are well practiced in the basics of maneuver and gunnery. Battalion and brigade staffs need preparation time also.

American military history reveals that this kind of problem extends far beyond the training environment. As an institution, we habitually neglect certain areas in the training of our ground forces. In the summary chapter of America's First Battles, John Shy points out that we have often failed to prepare for the command and control of our forces. No specific training has been oriented at preparing headquarters elements to exercise the command and control function. Historically leaders in peacetime become submerged with administrative requirements and the training of subordinate units; thus their study and practice of warfighting at the higher levels suffers. 7

On the other hand the AC has made tremendous steps in addressing this shortfall. The combat training centers work hard

and very effectively to teach maneuver battalion and brigade commanders, their combat support and combat service support battalion and company commanders the art and science of command, control and synchronization of assets and systems.

Likewise the Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) focuses on brigade through corps command and control. The Tactical Commanders Development Course (TCDC), an integral part of the precommand course for maneuver battalion and brigade commanders, also develops command and control skills of all AC commanders and those RC commanders who are to take advantage of it.

Modernization is another area of significant difference between AC and RC units. The RC needs several annual training periods after a major force modernization upgrade to fully absorb the new technology before they can effectively attempt large scale collective training. I think the lack of individual and crew proficiency detracted significantly from the readiness of some of the battalions of the roundout brigade of the 24th ID. This shortfall required precious time to fix during the Desert Shield predeployment trainup. The gunnery shortfall was directly related to the M-1/M-2 fielding in 1987; some crews had not yet reached an acceptable level of comfort and familiarity with the equipment. The training requirements for M-1 Master Gunner certification are very demanding. The brigade had no qualified M-1 Master Gunners. I observed these deficiencies during my support and evaluation of tank gunnery conducted by the tank battalion of the 48th Brigade (GARNG) just prior to a July 1990

NTC rotation. The the M-1 was issued to the battalion in 1987. They could hit targets on the tank crew qualification course (Tank Table VIII), but not within the standard gunnery time constraints required by US Army tank gunnery standards. They simply did not have total familiarity with the M-1 tank due to the relatively short period of time since it had been fielded. Training device availability did not fix the problem. The key to maximizing the gain from the Mobile Conduct of Fire Trainer (M-COFT) is proficient M-COFT instructor operators. If master gunners are not qualified on the system the instructor operators trained by those master gunners will not be trained to standard. Crew training will therefore suffer.

The RC has been undergoing a period of force modernization as equipment becomes available through scheduled modernization and the displacement of newer equipment freed up during the build-down. RC units for the next few years must carefully observe these priorities: full absorption of modernization upgrades (to include related doctrinal implications), development of a high level of proficiency in platoon and company level tactics, and concurrent development of solid proficiency in the command and control tasks at the battalion and brigade level. The AC must not attempt to rush this process. We must realistically assess the RC's status. The entire defense community should acknowledge how time limitations require that RC units take longer to achieve Army standards. They simply have less available time to master complex skills and to become totally

proficient with new, complex technology.

Most of these training deficiencies were pointed out in the annual training evaluations conducted during the 1988 and 1989 annual training periods. No routine system existed at that time for AC brigade and division commanders to review the results of Roundout unit training. In retrospect this is an obvious deficiency. The crush of normal schedules which, in my case, included NTC rotations, deployments to overseas training exercises, and normal home station activities led to this shortfall. RC commanders are under extreme pressure during the annual training period. The easiest path for the AC officer tasked with evaluation is to carefully word the training evaluation to prevent relief of the RC commander being evaluated. We need to rework the entire evaluation process.

STATUS of RC LEADER DEVELOPMENT

We are quick to blame. Goldich chronicles much of the controversy in his report for Congress (CRS). The General Accounting Office outlines problems with peacetime training and evaluation, administrative reporting systems and overall lack of senior level review of Roundout Brigade status. These significant problem areas contributed to the Roundout Brigades' inability to deploy quickly. 8 The bottom line is Roundout Brigades were never intended to be early deployers. 9. Nevertheless, steps must be taken to reduce post-mobilization training time and to determine how best to utilize the available pre-mobilization training time.

The reports I have cited discuss shortfalls in Military Occupational Specialties. They also outline deficiencies in key leader training and expertise.

Active Army assessments of National Guard officer proficiency stated that there were leadership deficiencies throughout all ranks. 10

Numerous and serious training and readiness deficiencies were found in all three brigades when they were activated. Perhaps the most serious was inadequate technical, tactical leadership competence among officers and noncommissioned officers at all levels. 11

Any commander who has entertained a GAO or Army Audit Agency visit will be automatically quick to discount to some degree the gravity of the tone of these reports. Then breathe a sigh of relief at not being visited by the same crew. Even so, these observations basically track with my experiences as an Annual Training (AT) evaluator in three evaluations between 1986 and 1990. The CRS report goes on to state:

Individual officers and soldiers were either not capable of performing, or in many cases were not even aware of the range of tasks they had to perform as part of a combat unit in the field, as opposed to the part-time environment in which they had been soldiering before mobilization. 'They didn't know what they didn't know' . 12

Given the constrained training time and facilities of a Guard unit, there was virtually no way for them to be able to do, and know of, all their duties upon mobilization. Many of these problems were not a reflection on the intrinsic abilities and potential of most of the brigades personnel. 13

The Guard and Reserve are here to stay. Many AC officers and NCOs are outspoken in their negative opinions of the RC. General Creighton Abrams understood the key role the RC play in generating popular support for the US Armed Forces. The RC is

the Army's bridge to the American people. We went to war in Vietnam without a reserve call up. The decision to not call up the RC isolated the war, to a great measure, from the American people. It became an attempt to fight a war without going to war. 14 The result stretched the active duty leadership, the officers and NCOs, thin by expanding the Army structure (numbers of units) from 11 to 16 divisions. This effort degraded and diluted the reserves. The RC professionals naturally felt disappointment and embarrassment at not being called on to participate. 15 RC units became a haven for people motivated away from the draft which had a negative impact on readiness. AC professionals faced repeated tours to Vietnam; this resulted in many resignations due to family pressures. The end result was a crippled NCO Corps by 1970.

The adverse impacts of the failure to mobilize were not lost on General Abrams. He was able, as the post Vietnam Army Chief of Staff and with the full support of Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, to develop a force structure that made it virtually impossible for the Army to go to war without the call-up of significant portions of the Guard and Reserve. 16

The Total Army concept completely integrated the active and reserve components. It prevented the shortfused expansion and stretching of the AC by requiring substantial RC involvement from the on-set of hostilities. No President could commit significant US Forces to battle without the support of the Congress and the People. 17 The linkage between popular support and the Reserve

Component was clearly visible in Operation DESERT STORM. 18 When the decision was made to attack Iraq, the concurrent activation of Selected Reserve combat units signaled the commitment to go the full course. Popular support welled up and the Congress was brought along and compelled to support the operation.

Reserve units are a essential. We get combat capability for 30% of what we pay for active formations. There should be no mystery in the fact that RC units cannot meet the same readiness levels of AC units because they do not have the same amount of time available. The contributions made by the individuals go well beyond what we pay. The level of commitment and dedication in most RC soldiers to their military duties has impressed and inspired me.

Even so, we have been quick to criticize them. In doing so we:

- (1) have not properly addressed shortfalls in field grade leader proficiency in combat maneuver units in the RC.
- (2) have expected too much (roundout brigades deploying without any or a minimum of post-mobilization training)
- (3) have not provided an accurate assessment of RC readiness or reviewed those assessments at senior levels.

CONCEPTS TO BE CHANGED

I do not intend to address the RC unit evaluation process. But there are significant grounds for improvement in this area. Work is being done to make this process more effective. But let's consider the problems of overexpectations and ignorance of shortfalls.

Consider first the Army's mechanism for change. The Reserve Component Training Development Action Plan (RCTDAP) is a Headquarters Department of the Army action plan. The proponent of the plan is the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations. It draws on the recommendations of various working groups to provide "the Army's roadmap for further improving Reserve Component training..." 19 The RCTDAP has become the Army's primary document for coordinating the multitude of supporting staff actions which will ultimately generate positive change.

In the collective training arena, the RCTDAP philosophy is highlighted :

RC units train to the same mission task standards as AC units, as specified in unit ARTEPS/AMTPS. The number of tasks may be less for RC units due to time and other training constraints.

RC units receive Realistic training opportunities enhanced through ROUNDOUT and Directed Training Affiliations (DTA) as extensively as possible.

RC units participate in Nonmechanized battalion rotations to the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) and appropriate world-wide training of Special Operations Forces (SOF).

ROUNDOUT units participate in unit rotations to the National Training Center (NTC). 20

"Bold Shift is a FORSCOM led taskforce formed to focus attention on improving both AC and RC readiness. It is a means to involve AC and RC leadership in solving mutual readiness problems.

The focus has been to select high pay-off problems and work toward near term results in high priority units. If those programs are successful in selected units, a follow-on assessment will determine feasibility for general implementation throughout the Army.

The Bold Shift task force is considering making RC attendance at the precommand course mandatory for future battalion and brigade commanders. I think we should be willing to pay a high price to make this happen. The gains would be worth it.

Both the AC and RC leadership are guilty of expecting too much. In the past RC units were sent to the NTC to complete essentially the same training regime as AC units. I am focusing on the NTC because I am unfamiliar with JRTC. RC units participate in the same sequence of events as AC units: arrival, equipment draw/orders prep, tactical road march, force on force/live fire operations, equipment turn-in/final after action reviews, redeployment.

The program is designed to stretch units to the maximum. It does this well. But RC units should not attempt the same regimen as AC units. The RC leadership is caught in the trap of trying to be "just like the AC". They cannot. Their training

opportunities are much different. This reality must be reflected in the sequence of activities at the CTC. RC normal operational-training constraints such as lack of equivalent training areas, geographical dispersion and the lack of opportunity and time to conduct large scale operations prior to deployment-significantly detract from their ability to move quickly to the field. The typical AC unit conducts an intensive 8-10 week train-up prior to going to the CTC. The unit is at or near its annual training peak before it deploys. If the brigade and battalion staffs are not prepared on arrival, the effectiveness of the training conducted at the platoon and company level will suffer greatly.

Forcing units to train at a level above their capacity is wasteful and not in accordance with our training philosophy. I think a more gradual ramp-up to force-on-force operations at the CTC would be more effective for RC units. Units subordinate to battalion level headquarters should conduct situational training exercises, controlled by the CTC staff. These exercises should orient on the Mission Essential Task List (METL) as their initial training event. Concurrently the battalion and brigade staffs should conduct command post exercises supported by Brigade/Battalion Simulation (BBS) and controlled by the CTC observer controllers. This exercises the staff, allows for easy rerunning of missions to fix problem areas. After the staffs have been "spun up", the brigade would be ready to conduct force-on-force operations from a greater level of competence.

Live fire operations could be integrated in much the same manner as we presently conduct them. The AC parent division would be responsible for augmentation of the CTC observer/controller effort as required.

This approach would avoid the initial paralysis that results when headquarters elements arrive not totally prepared to command and control full-scale operations. It attempts to make up for difficulties RC units experience by being pressed for time in the preparation for CTC rotations. It then allows them to focus their attention on preparing subordinate units for the rotation.

This problem of battalion and brigade level staffs not being trained to an acceptable standard is the symptom of a larger problem. Units spend too much time dealing with the day to day administrative burden. Staff officers find it very hard to focus on training for war. Not only training subordinate units, but also training their own staffs. We must work to reduce this administrative burden. AC units can manage this burden more easily than RC because of the time available. Insertion of AC officers into RC units would help free precious drill time for training. More on that later.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To enhance leadership competence at brigade and battalion level in the RC, we need to take three specific steps:

- (1) Make precommand courses mandatory for all brigade/battalion command designees.
- (2) Select commanders early, giving them time to

prepare for command.

- (3) Insert AC officers into the RC chain of command, eliminating AC advisors.

The RCTDAP suggests that the focus of RC leader development should be on developing critical tasks of planning, execution, and execution of training. 21 It also directs the establishment of a policy encouraging attendance at the branch-specific precommand course prior to or concurrent with battalion or brigade command, effective 1st quarter FY 91." 22

This does not go far enough. Several states recognize the importance of the precommand course experience and have established it as a requirement. It should be required for all prospective commanders, not merely desired or encouraged. But how can the requirement be made palatable? We continually pile requirements on the RC. All requirements consume time and money. Time is the critical commodity in the RC.

We must be vigilant to not create so many requirements that we severely limit the number of officers who can afford to command at the battalion level and above. A significant strength of the RC is the tie it provides between the US Army and the American people. We must ensure that the successful community and business leaders and managers in all walks of life can afford the time required to lead our units. We must further assure that they have the proper training to succeed.

Early selection of commanders is critical to making a mandatory precommand leader development course palatable.

Commanders must be selected approximately 24 months prior to the assumption of command; this would facilitate extraction of leaders from units and schedule precommand classes.

Approximately 15 months prior to assuming command, the officer must be pulled out of his unit duty position so he can attend precommand courses during the two annual training (AT) periods and the intervening inactive duty training (IDT) period. His duty status would then become battalion command selectee/student.

Then he would be enrolled in the Ft Leavenworth three-week PCC for the first AT period. He would attend his branch specific PCC for the second AT period. The IDT periods between those AT periods before the assumption of command would be dedicated as follows:

- (1) One MUTA 8- Reserve Component FORSCOM Leader Training Program to observe an CTC rotation. All participants would be RC battalion/brigade selectees. The program would run from a Friday morning (early) through a Monday evening.
- (2) Two IDT periods dedicated to a battalion/brigade simulation (BBS). Command designees would attend two structured BBS sessions run at an RC Regional training Center. Students would alternate through the staff functional areas. Quality observer controllers are critical to the success of this phase.

- (3) Two IDT periods dedicated to a Senior Officers Preventive Logistics Course, tailored to this specific student population, and conducted at FT Knox on two successive weekends.
- (4) Four IDT periods dedicated to the "Keep Up" program. The command designees would accompany their AC peers from their parent division or the Directed Training Affiliation (DTA) unit. These visits would be timed to allow close observation of those critical leader tasks outlined in the RCTDAP: planning, execution, and training assessment.

This schedule provides activities for 10 of the twelve IDT periods. Funding should be provided for all twelve periods. The remaining two IDT periods could be dedicated to specific weapons system training or other areas the individual felt deficient.

Several years ago the Army fully integrated safety into all we do, especially in planning training activities. We conduct risk assessment of all training. It has become almost automatic. The smart commander carefully assesses the placement and scheduling of training events to ensure they make sense from a budgetary standpoint also. By properly sequencing events in time and space, money can be saved in fuel and repair parts. All of this permits more training.

In order to ensure we maximize the training and development of our RC leaders, we must add them to our (AC) daily thought

processes. Active duty units schedule training well in advance. We must include future RC commanders in our plans. Can they observe an upcoming gunnery period? Can one ride in the back seat during an ARTEP evaluation? The closer the AC/RC linkages become the safer the next battlefield will become for our side.

AC soldiers should be inserted into RC units as members of the units. I realize this is a sore point with many senior RC officers. Full time support currently comes from Active Guard and Reserve officers. These officers are at a disadvantage when compared to AC line officers. The "duty in operational units" portion of their development is constrained by service in RC units as opposed to AC tactical units. They are not exposed to the same number of training events in a given year.

I propose we assign AC officers as full time company, battalion and brigade positions, perhaps as executive officers, or as deputy brigade commanders at brigade level. This course of action has its upside and downside. AC officers, along with AC master gunners, would bring a tremendous amount of relevant, up-to-date expertise to a unit. When an individual is assigned as an advisor, he is less effective than someone with responsibility for unit performance. A position in the chain of command brings ownership and clear responsibility for success to the job. The advisor's dearth of "new ideas" is suddenly tempered when the responsibility for execution falls in his court. A subordinate reacts differently to an advisor than to one with OER/SEER input or control over portions of a unit's budget.

A brigade could contain an AC OER/SEER rating chain within it. The AC deputy commander or XO would be rated by the brigade commander, senior rated by the parent division/DTA assistant division commander. The battalion XO (AC officer) would be rated by the battalion commander and senior rated by the deputy brigade commander/XO, and so on. This provides a check and balance in the system.

Some potential problem areas become apparent with this scheme. The RC response might be that this would cut RC field grade professional development opportunities because an AC officer occupies 50% of the field grade slots. This is true. But I think the return from the experience of the AC XO is worth the cost. This might be seen as cutting RC unit level field grade authorizations by 50%. This is not so. We have to carry the battalion commander designee some where on the books while he is in the PCC stage. I am sure the authorizations could be worked out.

A change or waiver to Section 1385, Title 18, United States Code (Posse Comitatus ACT) would be required. This act prohibits AC personnel attached to ARNG units from participating in State ordered periods of active duty.²³

The AC may respond that the officers assigned to this duty will not be able to compete fairly for promotion. This perception of the lack of professional value of service with RC units has existed for years; it is alive and well in both our selection board results and in our assignment procedures. George

Marshall and others of his stature were assigned to such duty in the 1930's. It is much tougher to plan, program and organize training, maintenance and the other logistical support for an RC battalion or brigade than for its AC equivalent doing similar training events. Officers assigned to RC duty under a unit membership role would be challenged and should be properly rewarded for their efforts. If a given % were selected for command, officers with the "right stuff" would flock to these assignments.

This system, properly managed, would permit more AC field grades to remain in the structure and provide a higher % of field grades the opportunity to be battalion XO's. Congress is patiently trying to get a similar message across to us by directing that 1300 AC officers be assigned to RC duty by the end of FY 92. I think we should agree and use this as an opportunity to increase authorizations. This would reduce the field grade hemorrhage due to the "build down"; more importantly, it would enhance our capability to rapidly expand the force if required.

SUMMARY and CONCLUSION

The Reserve Component of the Total Army is here to stay. We allocate a significant portion of our National treasure to them. They have proven their worth throughout our history, most recently during Desert Shield and Desert Storm. They provide a critical bridge from the Army to the American people. If we are going to trust the RC leadership with the lives of young Americans, we owe it to those young soldiers and their parents to

provide the best leadership possible. They expect nothing less.

Turf issues associated with manpower spaces, modernization priorities and control of budgets pale next to the flag draped coffin of a young soldier from Hometown, USA needlessly sacrificed because of incompetent leadership. Command is a sacred trust. If we place the mantle of leadership on any officer, we owe it to the nation to ensure that that officer is prepared to lead. There is no other way.

ENDNOTES

¹GEN Carl E. Vuono, "Today' U.S. Army: Trained and Ready In an Era of Change," ARMY 39 (October 1989): p. 18.

²Department of the Army, Leader Development Study: August 1987, (FT Leavenworth, KS : USCGSC, August 1987): p.VI.

³Robert L. Goldich, CRS Report on the Army's Roundout Concept After the Persian Gulf War, (Washington D.C. :Congressional Research Service, October 22, 1991) p.21.

⁴LTG (RET) Frederick J. Brown "Reserve Forces Challenge of the 1990's", Military Review LXXI #8, (August 1991): p.3,4.

⁵MG Joseph W. Griffin, "The Guard of the 80's", National Guard (January 1986): p.25.

⁶GEN Edwin H. Burba Jr., Testimony before the U.S. Congress, House, Armed Services Committee, Defense Policy Panel, March 8, 1991 as cited by Robert L. Goldich, CRS Report on the Army's Roundout Concept After the Persian Gulf War (Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, October 22, 1991) p. 43.

⁷John Shy, "First Battles in Retrospect", in America's First Battles, 1776-1965 edited by Charles E. Heller (Lawrence KS: Univ of Kansas Press, 1986): p. 239.

⁸U.S. General Accounting Office, National Guard: Peacetime Training Did Not Adequately Prepare Combat Brigades for the Gulf War, Report to the Secretary of the Army, GAO/NSIAD-91-263 (Washington D.C.: U.S. General Accounting Office, September 24, 1991), p.3.

⁹Goldich, p. 15.

¹⁰GAO, N.G. Peacetime Training, p. 18.

¹¹Goldich, p. 21.

¹²Ibid.

¹³Ibid.

¹⁴Lewis Sorley, "Creighton Abrams and the Active-Reserve Integration in Wartime", Parameters XXI (Summer 1991): p. 37.

¹⁵Sorley, p.38.

¹⁶Sorley, p.43.

¹⁷Sorley, p.46.

¹⁸Goldich, p. 50.

¹⁹U.S. Department of the Army, Reserve Component Training Development Action Plan, RCTDAP, (Washington D.C.,HQDA,ODCSOPS, DAMO-TRR, 18 May 1989), cover letter.

²⁰RCTDAP, p. 2-5.

²¹RCTDAP, p. 2-4.

²²RCTDAP, p. 5-7.

²³U.S. Department of the Army, Army Regulation 135-2, Full-Time Support, (Washington D.C.,1 June 1990.) p. 3, para 9 e (4).

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